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Financing drug discovery for orphan
diseases
David E. Fagnan1,2, Austin A. Gromatzky1,3, Roger M. Stein1,4,
Jose-Maria Fernandez1 and Andrew W. Lo1,2,5,*, alo@mit.edu
Recently proposed ‘megafund’ financing methods for funding translational medicine and drug
development require billions of dollars in capital per megafund to de-risk the drug discovery process
enough to issue long-term bonds. Here, we demonstrate that the same financing methods can be applied
to orphan drug development but, because of the unique nature of orphan diseases and therapeutics
(lower development costs, faster FDA approval times, lower failure rates and lower correlation of failures
among disease targets) the amount of capital needed to de-risk such portfolios is much lower in this field.
Numerical simulations suggest that an orphan disease megafund of only US$575 million can yield
double-digit expected rates of return with only 10–20 projects in the portfolio.
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The drug development process has become
expensive, lengthy and risky. In response to
these characteristics, and to the lackluster per-
formance of investments in the biotech and
pharma sectors over the past decade, traditional
sources of financing for such endeavors – pri-
vate and public equity – are waning as capital
shifts to less risky investments. Fernandez et al.
[1] argued that this problem can be addressed
by increasing the scale of investment and
pooling a large number of drug development
efforts into a single financial entity or ‘mega-
fund’. The benefits of diversification—lower
aggregate risk with more ‘shots on’ goal—yield1359-6446/06  2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Opa more attractive risk-adjusted return and a
higher likelihood of success. This, in turn, allows
the megafund to raise the required amount of
capital to achieve sufficient diversification by
issuing ‘research-backed obligations’ (RBOs):
bonds that are collateralized by the portfolio of
potential drugs and their associated intellectual
property. Because RBOs are structured as bonds,
they can be designed to appeal to fixed-income
investors, who collectively represent a much
larger pool of capital than do venture capitalists,
and who have traditionally not been able to
participate in investments in early-stage drug
development. For example, the total size of the
US venture capital industry in 2012 was US$199
billion, whereas the comparable figure for the
US bond market was US$38 trillion.
To illustrate the mechanics of megafund
financing using RBO securities, Fernandez et al.
[1] provided an analytic framework, simulation
software and empirical examples involvinghttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.drudis.2en access under CC BY-NC-ND license.cancer-drug-development programs. Their
simulation results suggest that RBO structures
can, in principle, generate reasonable returns for
debt and equity investors, while at the same time
providing a bridge for translational research in
the drug approval process. In a follow-on study,
Fagnan et al. [2] proposed an analytic framework
for evaluating the impact of third-party guar-
antees on RBO transactions, and found that such
guarantees can improve the economics of RBO
transactions at very low expected cost to the
guarantor. However, the examples in Fernandez
et al. [1] and Fagnan et al. [2] rely on very large
portfolios of hundreds of candidate compounds,
which raises several operational challenges
in the practical implementation of such a
megafund.
In this Feature, we explore the applicability of
the RBO approach by extending the framework
to accommodate drug discovery for orphan
diseases. Because of the unique pathological013.11.009 www.drugdiscoverytoday.com 533
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as the considerable support provided by the
Orphan Drug Act of 1983 (ODA), orphan drug
development projects frequently have higher
success rates and shorter times to approval but
still generate potential lifetime revenues that
are comparable to non-orphan drugs despite
their much smaller target patient population.
To capture a realistic representation of the
RBOs, we use numerical simulation techniques
to compute the investment returns of a
hypothetical portfolio of orphan drug devel-
opment projects. Given empirically plausible
assumptions for revenues, costs and probabil-
ities of success for orphan diseases, we find that
much smaller portfolios than those of Fernan-
dez et al. [1] – containing only 10–20 com-
pounds and requiring less than US$575 million
in capital – are sufficiently diversified to yield
reasonable investment returns for RBO inves-
tors. Although the investment returns of RBOs
are positively related to portfolio size owing to
the impact of financial leverage, for certain
types of projects the required threshold of
assets can be modest and it might be worth-
while to target these projects for an initial
proof-of-concept of the megafund financing
structure.
Orphan diseases and the ODA
In the 30 years since the ODA was passed, the
orphan disease landscape has changed drasti-
cally. Orphan diseases, formally defined as those
that affect fewer than 200,000 individuals in the
USA [3], were once anathema to the pharma-
ceutical industry. Today, this once-ignored
category of diseases commands a market worth
nearly US$90 billion annually [4] and is believed
to serve more than twice the number of all US
cancer patients – at least 25 million Americans
are afflicted with one of almost 7000 recognized
rare diseases [5]. Clearly as a collective, rare
diseases are not rare at all.
Before 1983 and the ODA, orphan diseases
posed too many challenges for industry to
confront seriously. Approximately 80% of rare
diseases are caused by underlying genetic
defects, which can be hard to identify [6]. Others
are caused by exposures to rare and unusual
toxins. Some orphan diseases are so uncommon
that afflicted individuals might not be correctly
diagnosed for many years, and there are
instances of afflicted individuals never receiving
a correct diagnosis [7]. Additionally, the rigorous
standards of the FDA for clinical trials often
meant that assembling patient populations of
sufficient size for testing was exceedingly diffi-
cult. The ODA has been broadly acclaimed for its534 www.drugdiscoverytoday.comeffectiveness in diminishing these barriers to
development.
The ODA and its subsequent revisions pro-
vided several important economic incentives to
sponsors of orphan drugs. To jumpstart thera-
peutic development in the rare disease category,
the ODA created research grants specifically for
orphan drug research, implemented tax credits
of up to 50% for clinical testing costs, authorized
expedited regulatory review for orphan drugs
and, most importantly, established a 7-year
period of marketing exclusivity that precludes
FDA approval of the same or generic drugs for
the same orphan indication [8]. The exclusivity
provision is distinct from a patent and, in many
cases, provides additional protection from
competition by generics and other potential
market entrants.
The combination of the ODA incentive pro-
gram and several significant scientific break-
throughs in molecular biology and genome
sequencing has resulted in three decades of
innovative and fruitful orphan drug discovery.
Before the ODA, the FDA had approved fewer
than ten drugs for orphan diseases; today, that
figure stands at more than 350 unique
drugs (http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/
opdlisting/oopd/). Currently, orphan drugs are at
the forefront of global pharmaceutical R&D
trends. Although the compound annual growth
rate (CAGR) between 2001 and 2010 for new
molecular entities as a whole was negative, the
CAGR for orphan designations over the same
period was robust at approximately 10% [9]. The
overall drug market also reflects this trend.
Orphan drugs currently comprise 22% of total
drug sales with a CAGR of 25.8% during 2001–
2010, compared with 20.1% for the non-orphan
market [8]. Some industry developments sug-
gest that these strong figures could continue to
rise as the evolution toward more-targeted
therapies and stratified medicine progresses.
The suitability of orphan drugs for RBO
financing
Orphan drugs are particularly well suited to
portfolio financing. A primary reason is the sig-
nificantly higher rates of success that orphan
drug development projects enjoy when com-
pared with those of other disease groups such as
oncology or neurodegenerative disorders.
Orphan diseases are largely caused by a muta-
tion in an individual’s genetic code, most com-
monly manifested as a malfunction or absence
of one or more key proteins. If the underlying
genetic defect can be identified and character-
ized, it is often possible to create highly
targeted and effective therapies to address themalfunction and its symptoms [9]. Similar tar-
geting methodologies have been used to com-
bat rare cancers, notably for drugs such as
Rituxan1 and Gleevec1. Consequently, the odds
of a new orphan drug receiving FDA approval are
significantly higher than those of a non-orphan
counterpart. For orphan drugs that entered
clinical testing between 1993 and 2004 we
estimate the overall regulatory success rate to be
approximately 22%, whereas the comparable
figure for non-orphan drugs was approximately
11% [10] and the rate for anticancer compounds
was even lower at only 6–7% [10].
The success or failure of orphan drug devel-
opment projects is also less likely to be corre-
lated across diseases as a result of the large
proportion of orphan diseases that display
monogenic pathology or act through largely
unrelated mechanisms [11]. This observation is
particularly significant given the central role that
correlation has in determining the risk of a
portfolio of candidate drug compounds.
Although we are not aware of any longitudinal
estimates of historical correlations among drug
development projects, the scientific basis of
orphan drugs suggests that correlations are
likely to be small, especially when contrasted
with other disease groups such as oncology.
Many types of cancers have similar pathologies,
such as the deregulation of specific signaling
pathways and mutations in crucial oncogenes.
As an example, consider the Janus kinase/signal
transducers and activators of transcription (JAK/
STAT) and transforming growth factor (TGF)-b
pathways, each of which has been linked to
dozens of oncologic diseases [12,13]. Of course,
there are several orphan drugs in oncology but,
in contrast to larger classes of oncology drugs
that share a common mechanism such as tyr-
osine kinase inhibition or antiangiogenesis,
orphan drugs (as a distinct category) act against
a wider variety of targets.
Furthermore, orphan drugs have been shown
to have almost equivalent lifetime revenue
potential to non-orphan therapies. According to
Thomson Reuters, an average orphan drug can
be expected to attain sales of US$100–500 mil-
lion per year [14]. Small patient population sizes
are often compensated for by high per-patient
revenues. For example, Soliris1, a drug to treat
paroxysymal nocturnal hemoglobinuria (a rare
blood disease affecting fewer than 6000 indivi-
duals in the USA), is priced at more than
US$400,000 per patient per year [9]. Conse-
quently, the blockbuster drug model that is
characteristic of many top-selling non-orphan
drugs is equally applicable to the orphan market:
compounds in the top 29% of orphan drugs are
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revenue per year over their lifetime [14]. As an
extreme example of the potential profitability of
orphan drugs, we consider again Rituxan1 – an
orphan drug that is expected to attain dis-
counted lifetime sales of over US$150 billion, a
figure surpassed only by Pfizer’s non-orphan
Lipitor1 [14].
Finally, the ODA’s marketing exclusivity clause
provides a key financial incentive for orphan
drug development. One analysis of the 7-year
exclusivity provision found that its impact
extended the average combined patent and
exclusivity period by nearly a year, resulting in an
average competition-free marketing period of
11.7 years [15]. For therapies that receive
approval later in their patent lifespans, the
increase in the exclusivity period can be signif-
icantly longer.
Assuming average annual sales of US$200
million and a 10% cost of capital [16], we esti-
mate that the average present value of an
orphan drug’s revenue over its competition-free
lifespan is US$1.36 billion. In addition, we
assume that the profit margin, including cost of
goods sold (COGS) and marketing costs, is 60%,
resulting in a final average valuation of US$818
million. To demonstrate the sensitivity of our
simulation experiments to valuation assump-
tions, we also employ a less conservative esti-
mation of annual revenues of US$400 million [9],
which results in a final average valuation of
US$1.63 billion. In the next section we use these
values along with some additional parameters to
conduct a series of simulation experiments
demonstrating how an orphan drug portfolio
might be used as collateral for an RBO structure.
Orphan disease megafund simulation
The financial engineering technique of securiti-
zation involves creating a legal entity that issues
debt and equity to investors and uses the pro-
ceeds to purchase a portfolio of assets. The debt
and equity securities are said to be ‘backed’ by
the assets in the portfolio in the sense that the
holders of such securities have certain owner-
ship rights to those assets. In particular, the cash
flows from the assets are used to repay the debt,
and all residual value is paid to the equity
holders. A primary motivation for securitization is
to reduce the risk of the individual assets
through diversification and to allow fixed-
income investors to invest in asset classes that
would otherwise be too risky or fragmented to
be of interest to them. In a biomedical RBO, the
assets are a diverse collection of biomedical
projects that can span the entire range from
preclinical research to new drug applications(NDAs) or focus on particular segments of the
drug development process. However, unlike
existing drug royalty securitization transactions
(e.g., Royalty Pharma, DRI), our proposal
accommodates investment in early-stage pro-
jects that could be far from FDA approval; hence
they have no discernible royalty stream at the
time of investment. As a result, the risk is much
higher, creating the need for more sophisticated
financial modeling of the economic value of the
portfolio assets as they progress from the pre-
clinical stage into clinical trials.
Fernandez et al. [1] presented a stylized
mathematical example of securitization of
experimental drug compounds and Fagnan et al.
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=2203203) developed
this example in more detail. Although illustrative,
this example oversimplifies the economics of the
biopharma industry. The authors also provide
results of a more detailed set of simulation
experiments that incorporate more-realistic
features of the drug-development process
including correlated assets, stochastic transitions
between clinical trial phases, the need to man-
age cash to pay interest and principal, realistic
valuations of compounds that are sold during
intermediate stages of the clinical trials process
and the need to manage cash to fund new trials
during the approval process. Fagnan et al.
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=2203203) extended
this work by analyzing the impact of third-party
default guarantees for a subset of the RBO
securities. They found that such guarantees can
greatly increase the attractiveness of RBOs,
enhancing their fundraising potential.
These simulation experiments extend the
framework of the stylized example to a richer
multistate multiperiod setting that includes
path-dependence and correlated asset valua-
tions. The need to extend the single-period
model arises as a result of the nature of the drug
trial process. At each stage of this process, larger
and larger cash inflows are required to fund
additional testing. Importantly, new investment
at each stage can only occur when there is
sufficient capital available that is not required for
other uses such as debt service or repayment.
The dominant source of cash flow for the
megafund comes from the sale of compounds
from the portfolio. Profits or losses accrue when
the megafund purchases a compound in one
phase and subsequently sells it at another phase.
Analysis of the portfolio primarily involves the
specification of four quantities: the transition
probabilities; the distribution of trial costs in
each phase; the distribution of valuations for
each compound that is sold in a specific phase;
and some form of dependence amongst thecompound valuations. Fagnan et al. (http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2203203) and the supple-
mentary material in [1] provide details of the
models and estimation. The pseudo-code for
these simulations is given in [1], and the source
code is available from the authors.
Following Fernandez et al. [1] and Fagnan et al.
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=2203203), we consider
an RBO transaction with a capital structure
consisting of a senior tranche, mezzanine
tranche and equity tranche. Because of the
complexities of the waterfall and the drug
approval process, numerical simulations are
used to evaluate the RBO securities. We focus
only on early-stage investment (preclinical and
Phase I), which represents the riskiest portion of
the drug-development process and where
funding is scarcest. We simulate acquiring an
equal number of preclinical and Phase I com-
pounds, with the goal of selling all drugs that
successfully complete Phase II trials. Our simu-
lation relies on several key assumptions and
parameters including clinical trial costs, valua-
tions and duration of each phase (See Table 1).
We derive our preclinical estimates from [17],
making the assumption that the preclinical
phase is similar for orphan and non-orphan
drugs. Kaitin and DiMasi [18] reported that
orphan drug trials in recent years take approxi-
mately 5.9 years from Phase I to NDA with an
additional 0.8 years required for the approval
process. The time for each phase is calculated by
scaling the relationships used in [1].
Clinical transition probabilities were estimated
from [19] based on a large-molecule dataset,
which we have assumed to be a close approx-
imation for orphan drugs owing to the increased
targeting specificity that characterizes biologic
drug development. Furthermore, we believe the
resulting success rate from preclinical to
approval (21.8%) to be reasonable based on our
analysis of recent orphan drugs developed by
pharmaceutical companies. Valuations for each
phase were obtained by discounting the esti-
mate described above based on the probability
of success and using discount rates of up to 30%
per year. Upon acquisition of compounds, we
follow [1] and assume that upfront and mile-
stone payments are proportional to clinical costs.
In addition, we increase our assumed upfront
payment amounts. Lastly, we estimate clinical
trial costs using conservative values for the
number of patients per clinical trial [20] and cost
per patient [21]. We assume a higher cost per
patient in Phase I to account for expenses
associated with locating suitable candidates for
the trial, which is inherently more difficult for an
orphan drug.www.drugdiscoverytoday.com 535
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TABLE 1
RBO simulation parameters
Phase Clinical trial cost (US$ million) Clinical trial success rate Clinical trial duration (years) Valuation (US$ million)
Preclinical 5 69% 1.00 7.1
Phase I 5 84% 1.66 27.6
Phase II 8 53% 2.09 75.6
Phase III 43 74% 2.15 321.5
NDA – 96% 0.80 701.9
APP – – – 817.6
Abbreviations: APP, approval; NDA, new drug application; RBO, research-backed obligation; ROE, return on equity.
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tions to be reasonable, to permit other
researchers to experiment with different values
we have made all of our assumptions and the
source code for our simulations publicly avail-
able with an open-source license (for further
discussion of all parameters, see: Supplemental
Information and Parameters provided online).
Simulation results
Table 2 compares the simulation performance
(using two million simulations) of an (approxi-
mately) optimized RBO structure to a traditional
equity model, assuming a fixed correlation of
20%. For comparison, we include results for the
equity-only structure using the same equity
amount used in the RBO, as well as a second set
of results for an equity structure, but using the
same total capital of the RBO.
The simulation acquires ten or 16 orphan
drugs (depending on the capital), with an equalTABLE 2
RBO simulation results using a target selling
Number of compounds
Preclinical 
Phase I 
Research impact
Number sold in Phase II 
Number sold in Phase III 
Liabilities
Capital (US$ millions) 
Senior tranche (US$ millions) 
Junior tranche (US$ millions) 
Equity tranche (US$ millions) 
Equity tranche performance
Average annualized ROE 
Prob. (equity wiped out) 
Prob. (return on equity <0) 
Prob. (return on equity >10%) 
Prob. (return on equity >25%) 
Debt tranches performance
Senior tranche:
default prob., expected loss (bp) 
Junior tranche:
default prob., expected loss (bp) 
Abbreviations: bp, basis points; prob, probability; RBO, resea
536 www.drugdiscoverytoday.comnumber of compounds in preclinical and Phase I
using a total capital of US$373.75 or US$575
million, respectively, substantially less than in the
case of candidate compounds in oncology as
discussed in [1]. The simulation extends for a
horizon of 6.5 years (in 6-month increments),
with an additional year used for the selling of
compounds upon liquidation of the remaining
drugs in the portfolio. The simulation is targeted
to sell compounds once they (successfully)
complete Phase II trials, but compounds can be
sold earlier in the process in anticipation of bond
coupon or service payments. Readers are
encouraged to download our simulation soft-
ware and re-run simulations with their own
parameters and assumptions, e.g., purchasing
drugs earlier in discovery or using an alternative
target-selling phase (http://www.argentumlux.
org/documents/RBOToolbox_112713.zip). (For
sensitivity analysis of some of the parameters,
see Supplemental Information and Parameters.) phase of Phase III
All equity (same equity) RBO 
5 8 
5 8 
1.1 2.2 
3.1 4.7 
373.75 575 
– 86.25
– 115 
373.75 373.7
10.7% 13.4%
0.2 bp 60 b
16.1% 13.1%
54.7% 66.7%
7.8% 18.4%
– 0.8, <
– 56, 1
rch-backed obligation; ROE, return on equity.Using an equity-only structure with capital of
US$373.75 million, Table 2 reports that the mean
return on equity in our experiments was 10.7%,
nearly 3% below the RBO, whereas the prob-
ability of loss of equity was also higher, resulting
in 16.1% compared with 13.1% for the RBO. By
increasing the capital used in the equity-only
model to US$575 million, the probability of loss
to equity is reduced to 10.1%, with a smaller
improvement to expected return on equity,
which had a mean value of 11.8%. Using the
higher level of capital, the RBO and same-capital
equity-only structures sell around five Phase III
compounds on average, compared with about
three for the smaller level of capital. Thus, the
RBO achieves a higher return on equity, a modest
increase in the probability of loss, but more than
twice the probability of receiving a return on
equity larger than 25%. This higher equity return
is caused by the increased use of leverage, which
comes with more risk to equity holders, as can beAll equity (same capital)
8
8
1.7
5.0
575
 –
–
5 575
 11.8%
p <0.1 bp
 10.1%
 59.77%
 6.27%
0.1 –
5 –
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TABLE 3
RBO simulation results using a target selling phase of Phase III, a Phase II valuation of US$174 million and a Phase III valuation of US$643
million, corresponding to sales of US$400 million per year [9]
All equity (same equity) RBO All equity (same capital)
Number of compounds
Preclinical 3 8 8
Phase I 3 8 8
Research impact
Number sold in Phase II 0.7 2.3 1.7
Number sold in Phase III 1.8 4.6 5.0
Liabilities
Capital (US$ millions) 230 575 575
Senior tranche (US$ millions) — 115 —
Junior tranche (US$ millions) — 230 —
Equity tranche (US$ millions) 230 230 575
Equity tranche performance
Average annualized ROE 19.6% 33.8% 23.2%
Prob. (equity wiped out) 2 bp 81bp <0.1 bp
Prob. (return on equity <0) 10.4% 2.5% 14 bp
Prob. (return on equity >10%) 79.1% 95.4% 93.7%
Prob. (return on equity >25%) 40.5% 82.9% 45.7%
Debt tranches performance
Senior tranche:
default prob., expected loss (bp) — 1.2, <0.1 —
Junior tranche:
default prob., expected loss (bp) — 80, 27 —
Abbreviations: bp, basis points; prob, probability; RBO, research-backed obligation; ROE, return on equity.
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equity being lost in the RBO versus either of the
equity-only cases [60 basis points (bp) versus less
than 1 bp].
The leverage is achieved in the RBO structure
through the issuance of two tranches of struc-
tured bonds. The default rate on the senior
tranche of the RBO is approximately 1 bp, which
is comparable to the historical default rates for
bonds rated at the highest levels by rating
agencies. The default rate on the mezzanine
tranche is 56 bp with an expected loss of 15 bp.
Such relatively low default rates would probably
be attractive to fixed-income investors, given the
assumed coupon rate on the debt (5% and 8%,
respectively).
To develop a sense of the range of investment
returns that are possible, Table 3 reports the
outcome of the same simulations but assuming
annual revenues of US$400 million instead of the
original US$200 million for the same capital
structure used in the experiment of Table 2. As a
result of these higher valuations, we see
expected returns of 20–34% with a higher level
of debt supported by the RBO. Under this
aggressive revenue assumption, there is little
need for debt financing, given that a 19.6% rate
of return is considerably higher than that
obtained by the average biotech venture capital
firm over the past decade (but comparable with
the returns of the most successful ones). How-
ever, at the same time, the impact to the fund’srisk profile from issuing significant debt is
minimal. In particular, RBOs increase the prob-
ability of total loss over an all-equity model –
with the same amount of equity – by only 79 bp.
The risk of extreme losses in this structure
involves a trade-off between increasing diversi-
fication as a result of a larger capital pool on the
one hand and increasing leverage caused by
debt issuance on the other hand. Specifically,
although the average return on equity increases
from 19.6% in the all-equity-financed case to
33.8% in the RBO-financed case, the probability
of total loss for the equity holders also increases
by a factor of 40. Even so, many investors might
still prefer the ‘leveraged’ financing structure to
the all-equity version because of its boost to
returns. However, it should be emphasized that
the proper use of RBOs does rely more heavily on
the accuracy of the assumed parameters, given
that the default probabilities of the bonds and
return on equity can vary materially for different
parameter assumptions.
Concluding remarks
A confluence of factors is responsible for the
lower number of new drugs approved over the
past decade, causing some authors to suggest
that the current business model for life science
research and development is flawed [22–24]. The
productivity of large pharmaceutical companies
– as measured by the number of new molecular
entity and biologic license applications per dollarof R&D investment – has declined over recent
years (http://ssrn.com/abstract=2203203), and
their stock-price performance over the past
decade – an annualized return of -1.2% for the
New York Stock Exchange Arca Pharmaceutical
Index during the period from 2 January 2002 to 1
July 2013 – has been equally disappointing.
Despite the near doubling of the aggregate R&D
budget of the pharmaceutical industry from
US$68 billion in 2002 to US$127 billion in 2010,
there has been little appreciable impact on the
number of new drugs approved (http://www.
evaluatepharma.com/EvaluatePharma_World_
Preview_2016.aspx).
Fernandez et al. [1] introduced the concept of
RBOs as a means of channeling funds from
global capital markets to early-stage drug
development. A complication regarding the
original RBO model was that constructing
portfolios of the size described in the metho-
dology was untested and introduced several
potential operational challenges. In this article,
we have tried to address this by reporting the
results of a series of experiments that suggest
that smaller portfolios – on the order of as few as
ten compounds and US$373.75 million of
capital – can still be used as collateral for RBO
transactions and deliver reasonable investment
returns.
The biggest drivers of this result are the
assumptions of a higher probability of success
and a much lower cost of conducting clinicalwww.drugdiscoverytoday.com 537
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Although the recent scientific literature and
biopharma experience in orphan diseases seem
to be consistent with these assumptions, this is
still a relatively young field with new findings
published almost daily, some of which could
change the simulation parameters and its result.
Therefore, our simulation results are, at best,
suggestive and not conclusive. Readers are
invited to download our simulation software and
re-run the simulations with their own combi-
nation of preferred parameter values. Never-
theless, we believe that, across a reasonable
range of simulation parameters, certain biome-
dical challenges can be met with megafunds of
much smaller scale than originally proposed by
Fernandez et al. [1].
Another implication of our analysis is that asset
selection – based on a deep understanding of the
scientific and financial aspects of the projects
being considered – is central to successful port-
folio construction, and that there are at least two
paths toward achieving such success. In cases
where success rates are unavoidably low and
failure is positively correlated between projects, a
large number of projects and vast amounts of
capital might be needed to achieve sufficient
diversification and an acceptable risk/reward
profile. However, when success rates are higher
and projects are less correlated, fewer projects
and less capital might be required.
This trade-off suggests that more-efficient
business models for drug discovery can be
developed by allowing the scientific and engi-
neering challenges of translational medicine to
determine the financing structure used to
support them, and not vice versa. Relying on
existing financing methods such as venture
capital and public equity may be inadequate to
address the rapidly shifting economic incen-
tives arising from scientific breakthroughs such
as big data, biomarkers, the omics revolution
and precision medicine, and political and reg-
ulatory changes.
These changes might not bode well for the
profitability of orphan drugs. Indeed, there is a
growing concern that the rising cost of drugs like
Soliris1 is unsustainable; hence our simulation
results should be regenerated and re-evaluated
as the economic landscape changes. But one of
the primary drivers of the megafund concept is
the financial efficiency gains from pooling a
large number of diverse investments into a
single portfolio. Such efficiency gains could, in
fact, contribute to a lowering of the cost of
developing drugs for rare diseases and accel-
erate the industry toward a more sustainable
business model.538 www.drugdiscoverytoday.comFinally, our orphan drug development simu-
lations hint at an intriguing potential future for
the biopharma industry. As diagnostic techni-
ques and our understanding of the molecular
basis of disease become more and more precise,
it is conceivable that most diseases could
eventually be ‘orphanized’. By stratifying patient
populations sufficiently finely to increase the
efficacy of a candidate drug – thereby increasing
the probability of approval and decreasing the
correlation of failure among projects – we
reduce the amount of capital and the number of
shots on goal needed to achieve an attractive
risk/reward profile. The financial economics of
orphan drug development show that, in addition
to scientific and ethical motivations for devel-
oping targeted therapies, there are important
financial incentives as well.
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